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This Essay is based on the transcript of my opening remarks at the University of
California, Davis Law Review’s Symposium The Daubert Hearing — From All the
Critical Perspectives. It has been revised substantially to make it appropriate for
publication. However, I have endeavored to retain the spirit of my original remarks so
that it matches the tone of the rest of this issue, which is presented in transcript form.
I was honored to have been asked to provide the introduction to this exciting and
important Symposium issue. In his more than generous introduction of me, Professor
Edward Imwinkelried noted my standing in the field. However, I must say at the start
that it is extremely daunting to be heralded as any sort of expert in this area by
Professor Imwinkelried since he is the leading expert on scientific evidence in the
country. Therefore, I wish to express my appreciation and great respect for Professor
Imwinkelried’s invitation to contribute to this Symposium and, indeed, his guidance
throughout my career. I would also like to express my special appreciation and regard
for the editors of the UC Davis Law Review. Their support and their patience have
been invaluable and I am deeply grateful for all of their assistance. Finally, I am
grateful to Shayna Lewis for her valuable editing and research assistance.

101

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2223045

FAIGMAN MACRO V2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

102

University of California, Davis

2/12/2013 4:47 PM

[Vol. 46:nnn

1. The Flexibly Liberal but Rigorously Conservative
Daubert Standard ........................................................ 118
2. What the Daubert Trilogy Sought to Accomplish ...... 122
III. MANAGERIAL JUDGING ............................................................. 128
A. Deference to Trial Court Admissibility Decisions ............... 130
B. The Daubert Trilogy, Weisgram, and Summary
Dispositions ....................................................................... 133
C. Do the Rigors of Daubert Apply Equally to Criminal
Cases? ............................................................................... 134
CONCLUSION....................................................................................... 137

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2223045

FAIGMAN MACRO V2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/12/2013 4:47 PM

The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity

103

INTRODUCTION
June 28, 2013 marks the twentieth anniversary of Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 I am a fan and have been one since it was
decided.2 Although the impact of Daubert on trial court practice has
been heartily debated, I firmly believe that the decision was
revolutionary, though many of its far-reaching effects have yet to be
felt.3 But that is the nature of revolutions: they cannot be fully
measured when in the midst of them, nor can their future
consequences be predicted with precision. When asked about the
French Revolution in 1973, Zhou Enlai reputedly stated that it
remained “too early to say.”4 This Essay, then, stands as something of
an ongoing assessment. Twenty years of experience with Daubert gives
1

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Indeed, I advocated the basic approach the Court adopted in Daubert in an
article published four years prior to that decision. See David L. Faigman, To Have and
Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38
EMORY L.J. 1005, 1009-10 (1989) (“The legal relevance of social science findings
should depend on their scientific strength, that is, on the ability of social scientists to
answer validly the questions posed to them.”). But, alas, the idea of basing the
admissibility of scientific evidence on scientific merit (as opposed to its general
acceptance in the pertinent field) was promulgated by others before me, most notably
including another participant in this Symposium, Bert Black. See Bert Black, A Unified
Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 599 (1988) (proposing “a
theoretical framework based on distinguishing two aspects of relevancy: (1) the
validity of the reasoning leading to a conclusion, and (2) the reliability of the
conclusion”) (emphasis in original); see also Andre Moenssens, Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence — An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545, 56774 (1984) (proposing a process by which scientific evidence would be evaluated on
the basis of its “reliability for a specific purpose”).
3
Thirteen years ago I had the opportunity to write on the occasion of Daubert’s
seventh anniversary and there described it as a revolutionary event. See David L.
Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations on the Law’s Use
of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661, 661 (2000).
That revolution has been more chaotic and has taken longer to solidify than I
expected. I suspect that in ten years, on the occasion of Daubert’s thirtieth anniversary,
I will still be at least somewhat dissatisfied with what progress has been made. But I
look forward to writing on that occasion as well. It’s worth noting, finally, that others
have also described Daubert as constituting a paradigm shift or, in other words,
revolutionary. See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift
in Forensic Identification, 309 SCIENCE 892, 892 n.9 (2005).
4
There is considerable debate regarding whether this oft-quoted wisdom is an
accurate depiction of Zhou Enlai’s response to the question of the French Revolution’s
legacy. Rather than referring to the Revolution of 1789, which gives the quotation so
much resonance, some have suggested that the former premier was referring to the
student revolts of 1968, making the observation rather less profound. See Richard
McGregor, Zhou’s cryptic caution lost in translation, FIN. TIMES, June 10, 2011, http://www.
ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/74916db6-938d-11e0-922e-00144feab49a.html#axzz2AWSChjFi.
2
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us much to consider and some outlines of the Daubert revolution can,
at least, be identified, while others remain inchoate.
Use of the revolutionary metaphor, however, creates a certain
ambiguity, especially in the context of scientific evidence. There are at
least two different archetypes of “revolutions” that might be meant by
the metaphor in this context. The most obvious, perhaps, is the
scientific revolution, which largely was sparked in the sixteenth
century, gained traction in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
and continues to hold sway today.5 Although the scientific revolution
changed much in society, it was first and foremost an intellectual
revolution. The second kind of revolution, suggested by the allusion to
the French Revolution above, is a social or political revolution. While
these two kinds of revolutions are both very real, they are also fairly
distinct. The scientific revolution was an intellectual revolution that
resulted in a fundamental change in reasoning — that is, in gathering
information about the world in which we live. Although the scientific
revolution had political consequences, political change was not its
driving premise. In contrast, political revolutions — such as the
French Revolution — are driven by the desire for social change,
though they, too, are likely to be accompanied by fundamental
changes in reasoning or perspective. It might be said, then, that
whereas political revolutions have social change as their driving
premises and changed ideas as a consequence, intellectual revolutions
have changed ideas as their driving premises and social change as a
consequence.
Of course, the reality of revolutionary events is never as clean as the
archetypes might suggest. There is much smoke and many mirrors in
coming to understand any revolutionary event. So, too, is this true for
the Court’s expert evidence jurisprudence. Daubert began as a
relatively modest political revolution, but in the long-term is likely to
be known for the intellectual transformation it imposed on the law. At
least, that is the basic premise of this Essay. Daubert and its progeny
are best understood as originally intended to give trial courts
expanded managerial powers over expert testimony and, thus, the trial
process more generally. By employing the scientific sensibilities
necessary to effect this social transformation, however, the Court
unleashed an intellectual revolution that overturned the “Ancien
Régime.” Daubert thus began as a modest attempt to expand district

5
See JOHN HENRY, THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN
SCIENCE 1 (Palgrave Macmillan, 3d ed. 2008); STEVEN SHAPIN, THE SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTION 4-5 (The Univ. of Chicago Press, 2d ed. 1998).
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courts’ management of their dockets but ended up bringing scientific
enlightenment to the law.
I.

THE ANCIEN RÉGIME AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

Courts are obligated to employ some sort of standard for expert
evidence and so the main struggle in this area is over what principle
they should use to set that standard.6 Few believe that courts should
admit all relevant expert testimony that an advocate or proponent
proffers. In short, the fundamental question boils down to this: how
should courts decide what expert testimony gets to the fact-finder and
what expert testimony does not?7 One possibility is to survey experts
in the field and ask them whether the basis for proffered expert
opinion is valid. A second possibility is to charge judges with the
responsibility to consider the methods and principles underlying
proffered expert opinion and have them make the validity
determination. These two possibilities represent the two fundamental
methods by which courts have historically evaluated expert evidence.
The first, concerning what the relevant expert field thinks of the
proffered expertise, is credited to Frye v. United States.8 The second,
which would have courts independently assess the premises
supporting the proffered expertise, is credited to Daubert.
My focus in this Essay is on Daubert. But what Daubert is, and what
it is not, can only be understood by looking at the cases and evidence
rules that surround it. Rule 702 is the principal rule that controls
expert evidence and was the ostensible focus of the Daubert decision.
Daubert, however, generated not only a cottage industry for evidence
scholars and volumes of judicial opinions on its meaning, but the
Supreme Court revisited and refined its vision for experts two more
times in the succeeding six years. Moreover, following what is now
known as “the Daubert trilogy,” Rule 702 itself was amended in 2000

6

See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, in
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 3 (West
Info. Pub. Grp. 2011-2012) (discussing how courts are obligated to employ some sort
of standard for expert evidence and struggle over what principle should be used to set
that standard).
7
See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges — Gatekeepers or Usurpers?
Can the Trial Judge Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without
Invading the Jury’s Province to Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84
MARQ. L. REV. 1, 7 (2000) (“The fundamental issue is the allocation of factfinding
power between the trial judge and jury.”).
8
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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to more fully reflect the Daubert regime.9 That year, the Supreme
Court also offered important insights into its own view of Daubert in
the lesser-known case of Weisgram v. Marley.10 Thus, twenty years
after Daubert, there is much grist for the mill regarding the decision’s
import and importance including the Court’s many pronouncements
on the subject, the amended Rules of Evidence, scores of federal and
state court interpretations, and a vast body of scholarly literature.
Frye, of course, largely started it all and remains for many courts and
commentators the touchstone, at least for scientific expert testimony.
This section begins, therefore, with a relatively brief overview of Frye
and then considers in somewhat greater detail the changes wrought by
Daubert. If Daubert sparked a revolution, Frye represents the Ancien
Régime.
A. Frye’s Ancien Régime
The basic requirement of scientific evidence under Frye is that it
have “gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.”11 Although Frye was decided in 1923, it did not achieve true
notoriety until the 1970s, around the time that the Federal Rules of
Evidence were promulgated.12 In Frye, a 1923 District of Columbia
9
Rule 702 was amended in 2000 to embody the Daubert approach. See FED. R.
EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (stating that Rule 702 was amended in response
to Daubert, and many cases applying Daubert). The rule was then amended again in
2011 when it was restyled along with the other Federal Rules. See id. (stating the
Rules of Evidence were restyled “to make them more easily understood and to make
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules”). This “restyling” was not
intended to change the meaning of the rule. See id. Rule 702 now provides as follows:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.
10

528 U.S. 540 (2000).
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
12
See David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door,
Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of
Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1808 n.25 (1994).
11
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appellate decision, the defendant offered an expert to testify regarding
the results of an early form of polygraph testing, the “systolic blood
pressure deception test.” According to the expert, the test results
supported James Alphonso Frye’s claim of innocence to a charge of
murder.13 The court excluded the evidence. In the following oftenquoted paragraph, the court set forth a new test for assessing the
admissibility of scientific testimony, the so-called general acceptance
test:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult
to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force
of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.14
The Frye test focuses courts’ attention on the respective field’s view of
its own members’ work. Thus, the Frye test, above all, is selfreferential in that it is only as effective as the field doing the review.
Although the Frye test appears straightforward, the simplicity of
stating it belies the complexity inherent in applying it to concrete
cases. There are three basic components to the Frye test, each with its
own intricacies. These are the substance of the proffered opinion, the
designation of what has been generally accepted, and the identity of
the particular field doing the accepting. These three components
generate three questions: (1) at what conceptual level should the
expert opinion be judged; (2) whether the scientific principle that is
relevant under applicable law is the same as what is generally accepted
in the field; and (3) which scientific field should be consulted to assess
general acceptance. I examine these in turn.
The Frye test itself does not specify the conceptual level of
generality at which the disputed “scientific principle or discovery”
should be assessed. This issue, in fact, presents a spectrum of options
for courts. On one pole, a court could simply find that a particular
methodology is “generally accepted” and admit expert opinions based
on that methodology without checking whether it was employed
correctly or even permits the sort of opinions proffered. At this
13

See James Starrs, A Still Life Watercolor: Frye v. United States, 27 J. FORENSIC
SCI. 684, 688 (1982).
14
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
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extreme, Frye would not require that the technique has been validated
for the use to which it is put in the courtroom, so long as it is valid for
some use. Such an approach might allow a neuroscientist to testify
about a person’s gambling addiction using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) technology because fMRI methodology is
generally accepted, even if it has not been validated for this particular
use. At the other pole, a court might require not only that fMRI be a
generally accepted technology, but that it could be, and was, properly
applied to the case at hand. At this extreme, the trial court would be
required to ensure that the specific application of the technique in the
instant case was validly performed. A middle ground might involve a
court checking whether the fMRI is a valid technology that extends to
the particular use for which it is offered but, if so, leave to the factfinder the question whether the technology was employed reliably in
the case at hand. Inevitably, the debate regarding where along this
spectrum presents the better interpretation of a court’s obligations
under Frye depends on the jurisdiction’s view of the proper division of
authority between judge and fact-finder. A jurisdiction that gives
judges little responsibility to ensure the accuracy of expert opinion
evidence would limit threshold review to the most general level of
assessment. Jurisdictions that mandate a rigorous role for judges
would require a more searching and particularized assessment.
A second question pivotal to the proper application of the Frye test
is whether the scientific field conceptualizes the subject in the same
way that the law understands it. After all, if the law asks whether a
specific
scientific
principle
is
generally
accepted,
any
misunderstanding regarding just what “principle” is at issue will
invalidate the answer provided by the particular field. For example, if
psychologists were asked whether Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) is generally accepted, their answer would be yes. PTSD is a
well-accepted psychiatric diagnosis as indicated by its inclusion in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.15 However, its
acceptance is limited to therapeutic purposes; it has not been validated
for forensic purposes.16 The diagnosis of PTSD, therefore, might be
reliably associated with a person having suffered some trauma, but
may have little validity for identifying the source of that trauma. The
former is necessary for PTSD’s therapeutic use; the latter is needed for
forensic use. Merely asking whether a scientific methodology or

15

See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DSM-IV-TR 463-68 (2000).
See id. at xxxiii (explicitly eschewing any claim of etiological verity of its
diagnostic categories).
16
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principle has been generally accepted is not enough. Courts ought to
be careful to specify to what use the expertise will be put.
The third pivotal question presented in the application of Frye is the
matter of whom to ask about general acceptance, and, related to this,
whether courts should actually survey a field to obtain the answer. It
is intuitively obvious that this aspect of Frye is highly manipulable.
Courts can influence the responses they receive by either narrowing or
expanding the professional group that is defined as the “pertinent
field” under Frye. If a court asks only neuroscientists who use fMRI
technology to detect lying whether fMRI is generally accepted for lie
detection, it is likely to get a skewed view of the acceptability (i.e.,
validity) of the technology for its intended use. Yet courts regularly
limit their evaluation of the general acceptance of a scientific principle
or discovery to those with a vested interest in its affirmation. For
example, courts almost invariably ask only practicing latentfingerprint examiners whether latent-fingerprint identification is
generally accepted.17 Not surprisingly, latent print examiners
overwhelmingly agree that latent print examinations are valid. This
approach is not much of a test, since their livelihoods depend on an
affirmative answer. Courts would be well advised to reach beyond the
narrow field of experts who are employed in the profession that is in
question.
Finally, although Frye seems to contemplate that courts will actually
survey experts in particular fields, practice rarely matches this
expectation. Trial courts tend to be convinced by testifying experts’
assurances that the bases for their opinions are generally accepted,
though few experts are likely to have surveyed the field themselves or
have access to such surveys done by others. Moreover, the “general
acceptance criterion”18 refers to the opinions of scientists regarding the
expertise, not the opinions of other courts. String citations of other
courts’ admissibility decisions regarding the controverted expertise
should not alone be sufficient to gauge “general acceptance.”19 What is
generally accepted among courts may or may not be accepted by
scientists in the field. In any case, while other courts’ acceptance of

17
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 32-33 (Mass. 2005)
(finding fingerprint identification admissible under Daubert because it was generally
accepted among fingerprint examiners).
18
See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
19
See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing other
courts’ general acceptance of police officer expert testimony under a Daubert analysis).
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some particular expertise is not irrelevant, it is almost certainly not
what was intended by Frye.20
Although Frye is not conventionally understood as requiring
scientific sophistication, the above discussion makes clear that some
appreciation of science would go far in ensuring the test’s
functionality. In inquiring about general acceptance of a particular
form of expert evidence, courts should at least ensure that it is valid at
a reasonably precise conceptual level, that the scientific principle in
question is one that is relevant under applicable law, and that the field
accepting it is broad enough to include non-true-believers but narrow
enough to include those who are knowledgeable in the field. For
example, a court considering the admissibility of polygraph evidence
under Frye should be able to define the level at which its validity is
being assessed (i.e., general accord between physiological reactions
and deception or as a diagnostic test of deception), the purpose for
which the test is accepted (i.e., for lie detection or as a prop in
interrogations), and the relevant field for assessing acceptance (i.e.,
polygraphers or behavioral scientists).
Frye, therefore, is not necessarily incompatible with an empirically
sophisticated use of expert evidence, but the test does not promote it
either. In contrast, Daubert’s focus on the methods and principles
underlying proffered expertise has exactly this effect.
B. Daubert’s Revolutionary Principles
Despite — or possibly as a result of — the volumes written on
Daubert, the decision remains generally misunderstood in many
respects. The basic holding of Daubert can be simply described. It has
three components, the first two of which are largely uncontroversial.
First, the expert evidence must be relevant; that is, it must relate to an
issue in the case. The Court referred to this element as one of “fit,” in
that the empirical basis for the evidence must help answer a fact in
dispute.21 Second, the expert must be qualified to testify on the subject
20
As a separate consideration, courts might indeed find that precedent supports
admission of challenged expertise, and citation of other court decisions would be
entirely appropriate to demonstrate that judgment. This basis is distinct, however,
from the inquiry set forth in Frye.
21
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993); see, e.g., McClain
v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[The expert] testified
at the Daubert hearing in a way more adjusted to agency-risk analysis than courtroomcausation analysis.”); United States v. Birdsbill, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1131 (D. Mont.
2003) (excluding psychological test intended for diagnosis and treatment that was not
designed for the forensic purpose of detecting when a person has sexually abused
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at-hand. This element is fairly permissive and can be met “by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.”22 It must be met,
however, in light of the nature of the testimony being offered.23 Third,
the “[p]roposed testimony must be supported by appropriate
validation,” what the Daubert Court referred to as “good grounds.”24
According to the Court, “the requirement that an expert’s testimony
pertain to ‘scientific knowledge’ establishes a standard of evidentiary
reliability.”25
Although the first two criteria for admissibility of expert evidence —
relevance and qualifications of the expert — are essential, the third
prong of reliability represents the revolutionary turn in this area. In
order to assess the evidentiary reliability of proffered expert testimony,
trial courts have the responsibility to examine the methodologies and
principles underlying proffered expert testimony to determine
whether those principles and methods are sufficiently valid to admit.
Under Rule 104(a), a court must find this preliminary fact — that is,
that the basis for the proffered evidence is sufficiently valid to support
the expert’s testimony — by a preponderance of the evidence.26 The
Daubert Court explained Rule 104(a)’s operation when a court is
“[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony,” as follows:
[T]he trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to
Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1)
scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to
understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that

children).
22
FED. R. EVID. 702; see, e.g., Banister v. Burton, 636 F.3d 828, 832 (7th Cir.
2011) (holding that trauma surgeon was qualified to testify as to whether shooting
victim had physical ability to throw something after he was shot, stating “[the expert]
is a trauma surgeon who testified as to the nature and severity of [the victim’s] injuries
at the time he treated him and then applied his knowledge of anatomy, gained
through his experience as a trauma surgeon and as a student of medicine, to
determine that the gunshot injuries would not have prevented [the victim] from using
his arm to throw an object, or from crawling”).
23
See Lujano v. Town of Cicero, No. 07C4822, 2011 WL 6097719, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 6, 2011) (quoting Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir.
1990)) (“Ultimately, ‘whether a witness is qualified as an expert can only be
determined by comparing the area in which the witness has superior knowledge, skill,
experience, or education with the subject matter of the witness’s testimony.’”).
24
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
25
Id.
26
FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
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reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue.27
The Daubert test, in contrast to Frye, focuses courts’ attention on the
methods and principles ostensibly supporting proffered expert
opinion. Whether that opinion is based on good grounds, therefore, is
a preliminary inquiry for the trial judge to determine.
In one sense, then, the gatekeeper function of Daubert is not very
revolutionary at all. Under the Federal Rules, preliminary facts are
handled routinely by this rule. Rule 104(a) simply requires that
preliminary facts be decided by a preponderance of the evidence. So,
on its face, expert evidence under Daubert is just like other kinds of
evidence that require courts to find preliminary facts in the process of
applying the Rules of Evidence.
This point can be illustrated with the simple example of the “dying
declaration,” which is an exception to the general rule against hearsay
statements.28 In order for the hearsay exception for dying declarations
to apply, the statement involved must have been made under a belief
of imminent death. That is a factual question. But it is a factual
question that is necessary to the application of the rule and thus one
that courts must make. In order to determine whether a statement was
made under a belief of imminent death, a court would likely hear from
witnesses — such as doctors, nurses, family members, and so forth —
regarding the declarant’s knowledge of his or her condition and
likelihood of surviving. Rules of evidence are replete with preliminary
facts that are necessary to their application. Other examples include
whether a particular out-of-court statement was made in furtherance
of a conspiracy under Rule 801(2)(E), or whether, under Rule 803(2),
an out of court statement “relat[ed] to a startling event or condition,
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it
caused.”29 Thus, under Daubert, the question whether the methods or
principles underlying an expert opinion are more likely than not valid
is merely a preliminary fact to be resolved under Rule 104(a).
The question, however, is, “Well, just how do judges do that?”
Inherent in this inquiry lies the revolutionary character of Daubert, as
well as much of the confusion that has adhered to that decision. The
Daubert Court noted that in exercising their gatekeeping function of

27

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93 (emphasis added).
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (“In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil case, a
statement that the declarant, while believing the declarant’s death to be imminent,
made about its cause or circumstances.”)
29
FED. R. EVID. 801(2)(E), 803(2).
28
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evaluating the underlying basis for proffered scientific evidence,
judges might consider certain factors that would help them make this
determination. By now, these factors are well known and include
testability, peer-review and publication, error rate, and general
acceptance. With regard to testability, the Court found that the
scientific status of testimony was tied to “it’s falsifiability, or
refutability, or testability.”30 The Court asserted that, “a key question
to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is
scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it
can be (and has been) tested.”31 The second factor the Court identified,
somewhat related to the first, was the “error rate” associated with the
“particular scientific technique.”32 The Court provided precious little
detail about how error rates affect admissibility, simply noting that
courts should “ordinarily” consider them and ensure that “standards”
exist to control “the technique’s operation.”33 The third factor the
Court identified that might assist courts preliminarily assessing the
validity of the methods and principles of proffered expert testimony
30
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (quoting KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS:
THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)).
31
Id. at 593 (emphasis added). For example, in Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc.,
663 F.3d 887, 899 (7th Cir. 2011), the court affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of
plaintiff’s engineering expert who sought to testify that a scaffold was defectively
designed causing plaintiff’s fall and subsequent injuries. The Seventh Circuit criticized
the expert’s more than “shaky” proof, including his use of Google to search for articles
on “brittle fracture,” the putative cause of the accident. Id. at 894. More generally, the
court observed as follows:

[The expert] made no attempt to test his hypothesis. [Plaintiff] suggests that
this inquiry is unnecessary because [the expert] needed nothing more than
his engineering background and experience to conclude that the caster stem
collapsed on account of a brittle fracture brought on by overtightening. But
that theory is certainly capable of being tested.
Id. Compare Charney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 10-14267-CIV, 2011 WL 3844077,
at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2011) (finding adequate the fire expert’s contention that “he
‘tested’ the hypothesis through mental exercises”), with Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co. v.
Tecumseh Prod. Co., 767 F. Supp. 2d 549, 555 (D. Md. 2011) (“Neither Plaintiff nor
[the fire expert] himself describe any attempts to gather data or create conditions that
might falsify his explanation, which is what testing, in its scientific sense, means.
Rather, all the Court is able to infer from these vague and conclusory accounts is that
[the expert] observed three different heat pumps, imagined a sequence of events that
would be consistent with his observations, and went no further.”) (emphasis in
original).
32
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
33
Id. See generally D. Michael Risinger, Whose Fault? — Daubert, the NAS Report,
and the Notion of Error in Forensic Science, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 519, 519-20, 527-29
(2010).
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was whether the research “has been subjected to peer review and
publication.”34 The Court emphasized that this factor was “not a sine
qua non of admissibility,” but was a “relevant . . . consideration in
assessing . . . scientific validity.”35 Finally, the Court stated, “‘general
acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry.”36 Lack of general
acceptance, the Court observed, may lead judges to view the particular
evidence “with skepticism.”37
Early on, some courts and commentators thought that these four
factors constituted the holding of Daubert.38 But this approach is
incorrect. The holding of Daubert is the requirement that judges find
as a preliminary fact that the methods and principles underlying
proffered expert testimony are sufficiently valid to support that
testimony. The four “Daubert factors” were offered as guidelines to
help courts assess expert testimony. These guidelines will sometimes
be helpful, and sometimes not, and courts might consider other

34

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
Id.; see, e.g., Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 721 (7th Cir. 2000)
(finding that district court abused its discretion in excluding plaintiff’s experts on the
sole basis that the research they relied on had not appeared in peer reviewed journals).
36
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
37
Id. In United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (D. Md. 2002), the court
considered a variety of different kinds of standard field sobriety tests (SFSTs), such as
the “walk and turn” test, the “one leg stand” test, and the “horizontal gaze nystagmus”
test. On the question of general acceptance, the court offered the following insightful
observations regarding what group of professionals should be surveyed to gauge
acceptance:
35

Similarly, despite the conclusion of many state courts that the SFSTs have
received general acceptance among criminologists, law enforcement
personnel, highway safety experts and prosecutors, I remain skeptical
whether this is sufficient for purposes of Daubert and Kumho Tire.
Acceptance by a relevant scientific or technical community implies that that
community has the expertise critically to evaluate the methods and
principles that underlie the test or opinion in question. However skilled law
enforcement officials, highway safety specialists, prosecutors and
criminologists may be in their fields, the record before me provides scant
comfort that these communities have the expertise needed to evaluate the
methods and procedures underlying human performance tests such as the
SFSTs.
Id. at 557.
38
See, e.g., Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 567-68 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (stating that Daubert requires the consideration of certain factors, namely
“whether the technique (or theory) being advanced by the expert can be or has been
tested,” “whether there is peer review and publication of the technique,” and “general
acceptance”).
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criteria to help them make the necessary preliminary inquiry.39 It is
clear, however, that courts must use some set of criteria and explain
clearly what they are. Moreover, as Justice Scalia pointed out
concurring in Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael, although “the
Daubert factors are not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to
apply one or another of them may be unreasonable, and hence an
abuse of discretion.”40
On its face, therefore, Daubert merely employed the existing
scaffolding of the Federal Rules of Evidence to make scientific validity
a preliminary fact necessary to the application of Rule 702. This
scaffolding, however, concealed the radical character of the decision.
Like most revolutionary ideas, the incendiary core of Daubert is a
simple one. Daubert altered the perspective by which expert evidence,
and particularly scientific research, was evaluated by the courts. Prior
to Daubert, courts at most inspected merely the outer forms of expert
evidence. Daubert reset courts’ gaze onto the inner workings of
knowledge gathering. This shift marked a sea change and gave to
courts the core instrument of the enlightenment, the scientific
method. Daubert constituted a frontal assault on the Ancien Régime,
thus giving birth to modernity in the law’s use of expertise.
C. Daubert’s Revolutionary Turn
Daubert focused courts’ attention on the methods of knowledge
gathering. Judges under Daubert were expected to know how science
worked, not simply rely on self-proclaimed experts to tell them what
to believe. The Daubert Court tasked lower courts with the obligation
to assess “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”41 This task
plainly demands that judges have a fairly sophisticated understanding
of research methods and statistics. There can be little doubt that this
obligation to learn about science was a basic premise of the Daubert
holding. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist famously complained that
while Rule 702 “confides to the judge some gatekeeping
39
See, e.g., Marcum v. Adventist Health System/West, 193 P.3d 1, 4 (Or. 2008)
(listing seven factors that may be considered in determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence); see also Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New
Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 911-12 (1982) (listing eleven factors
for determining admissibility).
40
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 159 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
41
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
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responsibility,” he did not think that it imposed “on them either the
obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists.”42 While
there are many contested issues in Daubert and its progeny, the fact
that the holding demands that judges must now understand the
methods and principles of science is not one of them.43
Under Frye’s general acceptance test, in contrast, judges seemingly
need little or no understanding of science.44 All that is necessary is the
ability to count. Daubert separated the expertise from the respective
guilds that stood to benefit from their expertise being accepted by
courts. The question after Daubert became, “Where are your data?” It
was no longer, “Who else agrees with you?” This shift moved the
judicial focus from counting noses among the numerous guilds that
ply their wares in courtrooms everyday to examining the data,
methods, principles, and standards on which these guilds’ supposed
expertise lay.
What is most clear in Daubert is the basis on which proffered expert
evidence should be judged. It is to be screened on its empirical merit,
rather than its general acceptance among like-minded members of
42
Id. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
generally David L. Faigman, Judges as “Amateur Scientists”, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1207, 1209
(2006) (“In the twenty-first century — and the sooner the better — judges have no
choice but to become amateur scientists.”).
43
See PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA ROTH & JANE CAMPBELL
MORIARITY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1.08[b], at 45-48 (5th ed. 2012); Bert Black,
Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert:
A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 753-57 (1994); Bert Black,
Focus on Science, Not Checklists, 39 TRIAL 24, 24 (Dec. 2003). There are many
examples illustrating this fact, but two in particular are telling. First, on remand to the
Ninth Circuit, Judge Kozinski described the Daubert rule as “daunting.” Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Federal judges ruling
on the admissibility of expert scientific testimony face a far more complex and
daunting task in a post-Daubert world than before.”). Second, Justice Breyer,
concurring in General Electric Company v. Joiner, observed that the Daubert holding
“will sometimes ask judges to make subtle and sophisticated determinations about
scientific methodology and its relation to the conclusions an expert witness seeks to
offer.” 118 S. Ct. 512, 520 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
44
I say seemingly because a sophisticated use of Frye would require a substantial
understanding of science in at least two respects. Foremost, judges using Frye should
know enough science to know what the relevant field is. Many courts, for instance,
ask the very practitioners peddling the expertise whether their expertise is generally
accepted. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 32-33 (Mass. 2005)
(finding latent fingerprint identification admissible because it was generally accepted
among fingerprint examiners). If courts ask only latent fingerprint examiners whether
latent fingerprint examination is generally accepted, the answer is fairly
predetermined. Asking astrologers whether astrology is generally accepted will
produce a similar positive response.
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some guild. The question that arises with the recognition that Daubert
manifests an intellectual revolution in expert evidence law is why, or
to what end? Certainly, it is possible that the Court merely interpreted
Rule 702 to incorporate scientific sensibilities into the evidentiary
gatekeeping responsibilities of trial court judges. If true, this
interpretation would make the passage of the Federal Rules of
Evidence akin to Galileo’s heretical publication of the Dialogue
Concerning Two Chief World Systems. Galileo’s Dialogue, an early
hallmark of the scientific revolution, marks a fundamental transition
point away from pre-scientific thinking. Perhaps the Federal Rules and
Daubert were intended to mark a similar transition in the law.
However much respect we might have for Justice Blackmun and the
Court, this interpretation is a bit too generous. The more likely
purpose for Daubert and its progeny is more pedestrian. Specifically,
the Daubert trilogy principally concerned the fundamental purpose for
rules of evidence, which are meant to set the boundary between the
judge’s responsibility to determine admissibility and the fact-finder’s
responsibility to assess weight. But the story is slightly more
complicated than that. While the Daubert trilogy surely defined the
division of labor for finding facts between judge and jury, it also
broadened trial courts’ managerial responsibilities. As the next section
seeks to demonstrate, the Court’s revolutionary turn to the more
enlightened scientific perspective is integral to its apparent intention
to permit trial judges greater power to better manage their dockets.
II.

DAUBERT AS A POLITICAL REVOLUTION IN CASE MANAGEMENT

A central focus of debate immediately after Daubert was whether
courts were up to the daunting task of evaluating the empirical merit
of proffered expert testimony. A close second to this issue of the
judiciary’s scientific literacy was the question of the effect the Daubert
ruling would have on the admission of experts. The initial
presumption was that Daubert was meant to hold the line against junk
science, thus meaning it would lead to greater exclusion of proffered
expertise.45 As this section explains, there are good reasons for
45

This perception was the conclusion, for example, that Linda Greenhouse
reached in her New York Times story reporting the decision. See Linda Greenhouse,
Supreme Court Roundup: Justices Put Judges in Charge of Deciding Reliability of Scientific
Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/29/us/
thesupreme-court-supreme-court-roundup-justices-put-judges-charge-deciding.html
(“[U]nderlying the majority opinion was a concern that judges would not [be doing]
their jobs if they left it to juries to sort out untried or disputed theories.”). Courts and
commentators were more inclined to disagree on this matter. See infra note 50.
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reaching this conclusion. But Daubert is not simply an anti-junk
science case. The move to a science-based evidence scheme was, to be
sure, intended to tighten the rules of expert evidence. But this
tightening, I believe, was meant to serve a greater agenda than simply
an evidentiary one. It was meant to serve the managerial power of trial
courts to control their dockets. The first part of this section focuses on
the Supreme Court’s cases in this area and the 2000 amendment to the
Federal Rules, which effectively codified that case law. The second
part argues that this revolution in perspective — i.e., the move from
Frye’s Ancien Régime to Daubert’s scientific worldview — is a
component of a much larger phenomenon in trial court practice, what
has been referred to as “managerial judging.”46
A. The Daubert Trilogy, Plus Two
Conventionally understood, Daubert is not a single case. It is
generally described as a trilogy of cases, including Daubert itself,
General Electric Company v. Joiner,47 and Kumho Tire Company v.
Carmichael.48 To fully appreciate the import of the Daubert revolution,
however, two additional developments must be considered. The first is
the case of Weisgram v. Marley,49 in which the Court provided its own
interpretation of Daubert’s significance. The second is the 2000
amendment of Rule 702, which largely codified the Daubert holding.
Close study of these five developments from 1993 through 2000 —
the Daubert trilogy, Weisgram, and Rule 702 — makes abundantly
clear the Court’s own view that 1993 marked a fundamental
transformation in the law’s use of expert evidence.
1.

The Flexibly Liberal but Rigorously Conservative Daubert
Standard

While plaintiffs’ attorneys read Daubert to be a permissive standard
that would admit more expert evidence, not surprisingly, perhaps,

46
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378 (1982); see also
Robert Peckham, The Federal Judge as Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case
From Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 770 (1981). Daubert’s role in
facilitating active case management has been noted by others. See, e.g., Sandra F.
Gavin, Managerial Judging in a Post-Daubert World: A Reliability Paradigm, 234 F.R.D.
196, 196, 204-06 (2006) (arguing, critically, that this role for Daubert represents a
“shift to the right”).
47
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
48
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
49
528 U.S. 440 (2000).
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defense attorneys believed that Daubert would do the opposite and
result in the exclusion of more expert evidence.50 This debate has not
appreciably ebbed with time. Judges have long disagreed over whether
Daubert or Frye is the more restrictive test.51 Close consideration of
this issue, however, suggests that, at least theoretically, neither test is
inherently more permissive nor more rigorous than the other. It
depends on the evidence being evaluated under the respective test; the
tests alone are not inherently liberal or conservative.
Much of the blame for the hand-wringing that occurred over the
political consequences of the Daubert ruling lies with the Court itself.
The Daubert opinion is comprised of a cornucopia of confused
messages. The opinion began with a paean to the liberality of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the need for fact-finders to hear all
relevant evidence. Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court observed
that the “basic standard of relevance” in the Federal Rules “is a liberal
one.”52 It also noted the Rules’ “permissive backdrop” and the “austere
standard” inherent in the traditional Frye approach.53 Most
significantly, the Court stated that the “rigid ‘general acceptance’
requirement would be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal
Rules and their ‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to
‘opinion’ testimony.’”54 But much of the opinion concerned itself with
the trial court’s “gatekeeping” role and its need to evaluate the
“reliability” of proffered expert opinion. The Court stated plainly that
Rule 702 “clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the
subjects and theories about which an expert may testify.”55 The Court
held that “under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
50
Compare David Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2164-66 (1994)
(discussing when a plaintiff’s evidence can be excluded under Daubert to the benefit of
the defendant), with Kenneth Chesebro, Taking Daubert’s “Focus” Seriously: The
Methodology/Conclusion Distinction, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745, 1745-53 (1994)
(discussing how the Court in Daubert was deferential to the plaintiff’s experts).
51
Compare MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Patriarch Partners VIII, LLC, No. 09 Civ. 3255,
2012 WL 2568972, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2012) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993)) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence favor the
admissibility of expert testimony and are applied with a ‘liberal thrust.’”), with Cavallo
v. Star Enterprise, 892 F. Supp. 756, 774 (E.D. Va. 1995) (“Daubert assigned district
courts a more vigorous role to play in ferreting out expert opinion not based on the
scientific method.”).
52
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
53
Id. at 588.
54
Id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
55
Id. at 589.
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reliable.”56 Most significantly, the Court said that this holding required
trial courts to be gatekeepers.57 And the Court recognized that, “in
practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible,
inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic
insights and innovations.”58 The Court accepted this “balance,” since
“Rules of Evidence [are] designed not for the exhaustive search for
cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal
disputes.”59
Daubert’s mixed messages sparked considerable speculation over
whether the practical effect of Daubert would be less or more expert
testimony being admitted in court. It turns out that both views have
some truth to them. The split depends on the nature of the expertise,
or at least it should split on the basis of the nature of the expertise.
And that is because the revolution of Daubert really lies in the
scientific worldview it embraces. Frye, which requires judges to ask,
“Is this method generally accepted in the particular field from which it
comes?” is essentially a deferential test. Judges do not need to know
very much about science; they simply need to be able to count. So
judges ask, “You epidemiologists, is this method generally accepted?
Raise your hand. One, two, three, four. Those who think it’s not
generally accepted? One, two, three.” Daubert, in contrast, requires
that judges understand the methods and principles underlying science.
They have to understand what a mean, median, or mode is. They have
to understand basic hypothesis testing and research methods, possibly
what a standard deviation is, and maybe even regression analysis. And
if they do not, they cannot be effective gatekeepers. And it is this
insight that should answer the question whether Daubert’s effect will
be to admit more expert evidence, or less.
In traditional scientific fields, in which scientists collect data and
vigorously debate their meaning, Daubert should lead to more
generous admissibility standards than Frye’s general acceptance test.
Within mainstream science, hypotheses are more likely to have been
rigorously tested, despite ongoing debate about the details. Daubert
permits courts to consider the validity of the methods and principles

56

Id.
Id. at 588 (“That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not
mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of
purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such
evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”).
58
Id. at 597.
59
Id.
57
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underlying such expertise, and does not require a consensus to form
in the field. In contrast, in less traditional scientific fields, where little
or no data are collected and little or no vigorous debate occurs,
Daubert should lead to less generous admissibility standards than
Frye’s general acceptance test. In those fields, consensus has replaced
testing. Whereas Frye would admit such expertise based on the
consensus of the guild, Daubert inquires into the basis for this
consensus.
A good example of science coming to the law from a traditional field
is DNA profiling. At least in theory, DNA profiling should have been
accepted sooner in Daubert jurisdictions than in Frye jurisdictions.60
DNA profiling was tested, published in peer reviewed journals, and
had known error rates. But in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there
was considerable disagreement among scientists regarding, in
particular, what could be said statistically when finding a “match.”61
Healthy science operates in exactly this way. Vibrant debate, critical
commentary, and vehement disagreement are all hallmarks of
mainstream science. These characteristics can also mean that
consensus can be slow to develop, even when the fundamental science
is relatively sound. Well-tested, peer reviewed and published research,
with acceptable error rates, will often continue to attract strong
discussion, especially at the margins. Under those circumstances,
Daubert would be more liberal in admitting the evidence. In contrast,
under Frye, a court might say, “Well, we really need to wait for
consensus, let’s slow down.” So for a traditional scientific field,
Daubert would be more likely to admit it and Frye would be more
likely to exclude and await consensus.
In a field that is not traditionally scientific — and there is a lot of
evidence from such fields that the courts admit62 — Daubert would
operate as a more rigorous test and Frye would be a more permissive
60

I say “in theory” because to my knowledge no one has closely studied this
particular question.
61
Compare David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, and the
Courts, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 101, 119-20 (1993) (stating that simply sampling people
in the relevant population, analyzing their DNA, and reporting the number who
match the crime sample raises evidentiary and statistical concerns), with Richard C.
Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing, 254 SCIENCE
1745 (1991) (stating that the discussion of DNA statistics should focus on both the
significance of matches and mismatches). See generally DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE
HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (Harvard Univ. Press, 1st ed. 2010) (discussing the
struggle between prosecutors and defense attorneys over the admissibility of DNA
evidence).
62
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 91-97.
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test. Consider, for example, fields such as latent fingerprint
identification, firearms, clinical psychology, and clinical psychiatry. In
those fields, if judges ask the question, “Where are the data?” they
would be met with blank stares. If you ask a latent fingerprint
examiner, “Where are your data?” the answer is likely to be, “Data.
We have no data. In fact, we don’t need data. We’re specialists.” This
attitude is reminiscent of that famous movie line, “We don’t need no
stinkin’ badges.”63 Many of these experts have been practicing their
trade for twenty-five years; they know it when they see it. They don’t
need no stinkin’ data. Under Daubert, however, even if your data
happen to be experience, you have to be able to articulate how you
came to know what you think you know.64
2.

What the Daubert Trilogy Sought to Accomplish

Early on, courts and commentators began to consider whether the
gatekeeping role extended beyond trial courts. Specifically, logic might
dictate that appellate courts could have as large a role as trial courts in
ensuring that expert evidence was reliable. This duty might be
especially so if the ultimate objective is to develop a judicially more
sophisticated approach to scientific evidence. In General Electric
Company v. Joiner, however, the Supreme Court rejected the idea of
appellate court gatekeepers. In the case below, the plaintiff claimed
63
The line quoted in the text is from Mel Brooks’s inspired western comedy
BLAZING SADDLES (Warner Brothers Pictures 1974), clip available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lj056ao6GE (last visited Nov. 9, 2012). The
original version of this line comes from the book The Treasure of the Sierra Madre:

“All right,” Curtin shouted back. “If you are the police, where are your
badges? Let’s see them.”
“Badges, to god-damned hell with badges! We have no badges. In fact, we
don’t need badges. I don’t have to show you any stinking badges, you goddamned cabrón and ching’ tu madre!”
B. TRAVEN, THE TREASURE OF THE SIERRA MADRE 193 (The World Publ’g Co., 1st ed.
1947).
64
The Advisory Committee emphasizes the need not to simply accept
“experience,” without checking the basis for believing that the experience will
produce reliable testimony. The Rules Committee commented as follows:
If the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness
must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that
experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is
reliably applied to the facts. The trial court’s gatekeeping function requires
more than simply “taking the expert’s word for it.”
FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory committee’s note.
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that his exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) had enhanced
the onset of his lung cancer. The trial court had excluded the
plaintiff’s experts under a Daubert analysis. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed, holding that appellate courts maintained a duty to review a
lower court’s admissibility decisions, where the trial court excluded
proffered expert testimony and this exclusion was outcome
determinative.65 For the Eleventh Circuit, this stringent review was
mandated since it read Daubert to indicate that the Supreme Court
envisioned a “lower threshold” for expert testimony.66 The appellate
court believed that the judge’s gatekeeping role is limited to excluding
experts whose testimony is “mere speculation,” but does not require a
substantive review of the scientific basis for the expert opinion.67
The principal issue before the Joiner Court concerned the issue of
the appropriate standard of appellate review of trial court Daubert
decisions. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a unanimous Court,
ruling that appellate courts owe deference to a trial court’s
admissibility rulings. The Court held “that abuse of discretion is the
appropriate standard.”68 The Eleventh Circuit had erred in secondguessing the trial court’s determination that the proffered expert
testimony was unreliable.69 There are several aspects of Joiner that are
65

Joiner v. Gen. Electric Co., 78 F.3d 524, 528 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 530.
67
Id.
68
Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997).
69
One aspect of Joiner displays the Court’s basic lack of understanding of science.
In adopting the abuse of discretion standard, the Joiner Court treated scientific
evidence just like other kinds of evidence that trial courts hear. The preliminary fact
issue regarding validity under Rule 702, the Court believed, was functionally
equivalent to preliminary fact questions presented by other rules, such as hearsay. But
scientific evidence is different. In most evidentiary contexts, the preliminary
assessment that is required to admit or exclude ordinary evidence is specific to the
case at hand. In contrast, a significant component of assessing virtually all scientific
evidence involves making judgments about matters that transcend particular cases.
For instance, whether, and at what level, fMRI technology can validly distinguish
people who are lying from people telling the truth is not specific to a particular case.
Similarly, whether the brain structure or function of “psychopaths” is distinguishable
from that of “normal” brains is a subject of general research findings. As regards the
validity of scientific claims that transcend particular cases, therefore, a rule that would
make appellate courts partners in the gatekeeping process might reflect the core
principles inherent in Daubert better than the abuse of discretion standard embraced
in Joiner. See generally David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of Scientific Evidence Under
Daubert and Joiner, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 969 (1997) (arguing that the appellate courts are
uniquely situated to determine and balance the policy implications raised by the
science, to ensure consistency across jurisdictions, and to evaluate the methods,
principles and reasoning of multiple research studies); Christopher B. Mueller,
Daubert Asks the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should Help Find the Right
66
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relevant to the question of how the Court understood its own test.
First, the Joiner Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, which had
adopted a non deferential appellate standard that had a thumb on the
scale in favor of admissibility. According to the Joiner Court, the
Eleventh Circuit had over interpreted the Federal Rules’ display of a
preference for admissibility.70 The Joiner Court highlighted the
language from Daubert that obligated trial courts to screen expert
evidence to “‘ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.’”71
A second aspect of Joiner worthy of note was that Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court. Rehnquist had written
separately in Daubert, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and
had famously complained that the Court’s ruling would force trial
judges to become “amateur scientists.”72 But in Joiner, Rehnquist
considered in some detail the research that the district court had
found insufficient to support admissibility of the plaintiff’s expert’s
testimony, thus himself becoming something of the amateur scientist
that he decried in Daubert.73
The third significant aspect of Joiner was the Court’s clarification of
the language in Daubert that a trial court’s “focus, of course, must be
solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that
they generate.”74 This language had been cited by courts and
commentators as limiting the reach of the district court’s gatekeeping
responsibilities.75 But the Joiner Court observed that “nothing in either
Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to
admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the
ipse dixit of the expert.”76
The next big question on the Daubert horizon after Joiner concerned
the intended reach of that decision. Daubert, as noted, required courts
to ask, at least, whether the basis for proffered expert opinion
Answers, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 987 (2003) (arguing that appellate courts should
apply a de novo standard when reviewing rulings admitting or excluding evidence
presented as science). For the time being, however, the abuse of discretion standard
remains the prevailing rule in federal cases. I return to this issue infra Part III.A.
70
Joiner, 522 U.S. at 140.
71
Id. at 142 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)).
72
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
73
See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 144-46.
74
Id. at 146 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595).
75
See, e.g., Chesebro, supra note 50, at 1746-48 (discussing the distinction
between an expert’s “methodology” and an expert’s “conclusion” in Daubert).
76
Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
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testimony had been tested. However, many experts that had been
longtime participants in the judicial process testified largely, if not
entirely, based on experience or using technologies that had never
been validated. Experts from forensics, clinical medicine, clinical
psychology, and many other fields simply had no answer to the
question, “Where are the data that support your opinion?” A faithful
application of Daubert seemed to demand the exclusion of such
veritable forms of expertise as latent fingerprints and firearms
identification, medical and psychological diagnoses, and many others.
The nonscientific specialists’ response to this fundamental challenge
was elegant, if facile. Rule 702 speaks of “scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge.” Daubert, they argued, applies only to
scientific expertise. Technical experts or specialists do not fall within
the trial court’s gatekeeping responsibilities. Overnight, forensic
scientists and others shed their white coats and became specialists,
hoping to escape the rigors of scientific scrutiny.
In Kumho Tire, however, the Court disagreed that there was any
relevant evidentiary distinction between science and nonscience.
Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the Court, said that “it would prove
difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules
under which a gatekeeping obligation depended upon a distinction
between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’
knowledge. There is no clear line that divides the one from the
others.”77 The Court also rejected the proposition that jurors are likely
to be more impressed with the science label than with technical or
specialized expertise. The Court observed that all experts are given
considerable leeway to offer opinion evidence. Any concern with triers
of fact yielding to the authority of scientific opinion was similarly
present with all expert testimony.78
The more difficult issue presented under Daubert, and one brought
into question by Kumho Tire, involved the manner in which trial
courts should carry out their gatekeeping duties given the multitude of
disciplines that enter courtrooms every day. The Daubert factors could
not be applied to every sort of expert, and the rigor represented by
those factors might not be appropriate in all cases. Rule 702, the
subject of Daubert and its progeny, applies to neuroscience, real estate
appraisals, accounting, DNA technology, social psychology, and
clinical medicine. Kumho Tire extended Daubert beyond just
“scientific” expertise but elided the question of how trial courts should

77
78

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999).
See id.
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measure the validity of the great variety of expertises that courts
confront daily. The Supreme Court stated:
The conclusion, in our view, is that we can neither rule out,
nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the applicability of the
factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we do so for subsets of
cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence.
Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of the
particular case at issue . . . . [A] trial court should consider the
specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable
measures of the reliability of the expert testimony.79
Kumho Tire thus imposes on trial courts the responsibility to examine
the premises of all expert opinion, whether derived from rigorous
experimental tests or daily experience with the subject. The ultimate
question is whether the expert testimony is based on good grounds.
But what grounds qualify as good is something of a moving target.
The debate over Daubert’s import did not cease after Kumho Tire,
despite the strong language Justice Breyer brought to the expertise
proffered in that case. The Court emphasized that Daubert “imposes a
special obligation upon a trial judge to ‘ensure that any and all
scientific testimony . . . is not only relevant, but reliable.’”80 That
special obligation, moreover, applies to any “knowledge [that] might
become the subject of expert testimony,” not just of the scientific
variety.81 The Court stated emphatically, “And where such testimony’s
factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are called
sufficiently into question . . . the trial judge must determine whether
the testimony has ‘a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of
[the relevant] discipline.’”82 This mandate could be said to be the
79
Id. at 150-52; see, e.g., United States v. Thomas, Nos. 10-4725, 10-4729, 2012
WL 2951410, at *5 (4th Cir. July 20, 2012) (“The Daubert factors . . . simply are not
applicable to this kind of testimony [from a gang expert], whose reliability depends
heavily on the knowledge and experience of the expert, rather than the methodology
or theory behind it.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
80
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S.
579, 589 (1993)).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 149 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried,
The Meaning of “Appropriate Validation” in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., Interpreted in Light of the Broader Rationalist Tradition, Not the Narrow Scientific
Tradition, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 739 (2003) (“The courts should be open to a
variety of validation techniques, including, but not limited to, empirical induction and
mathematical deduction. Adopting the attitude of a skeptical rationalist, the judge
ought to inquire whether the results of the use of the technique in question
demonstrate that the technique ‘works’; that is, whether the technique enables the
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hallmark of modern scientific discovery. The scientific revolution,
after all, was never really about what we know, but how we come to
know it. Kumho Tire was as express an invitation to trial courts to join
the scientific revolution as the Court could have fashioned.
The Court’s own pronouncements in Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho
Tire seemingly make clear that the gatekeeping responsibility imposed
on trial courts was intended to be a serious and substantive one. If
there was any question about this, however, it should have been
answered by a fourth case, an unusual situation in which the Court
had the opportunity to comment on the Daubert line of cases. In
Weisgram the trial court had admitted expert testimony regarding the
source of a fire that destroyed the plaintiff’s home.83 The jury returned
a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the
lower court erred when it admitted the plaintiff’s experts, finding that
they failed to pass muster under Daubert. Significantly, and
controversially, the Eighth Circuit then ruled that, without this expert
evidence, the plaintiff had insufficient evidence to support his case,
and the court then directed a judgment in favor of the defendant.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit refused to remand the case to the trial court
to give the plaintiff a second “bite at the apple.” In agreeing that the
plaintiffs should not be given a second chance to find admissible
experts, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, stated:
Since Daubert . . . parties relying on expert evidence have had
notice of the exacting standards of reliability such evidence must
meet. It is implausible to suggest, post-Daubert, that parties
will initially present less than their best expert evidence in the
expectation of a second chance should their first try fail. We
therefore find unconvincing [the plaintiffs’] fears that allowing
courts of appeals to direct the entry of judgment for
defendants will punish plaintiffs who could have shored up
their cases by other means had they known their expert
testimony would be found inadmissible.84
The final piece of the puzzle regarding Daubert’s true import comes
from amended Rule 702. Despite the Daubert Court’s statement that it
was merely interpreting Rule 702 as it would interpret any statute,

expert to accurately perform the specific task at hand. As the task itself varies, as when
the expert puts the technique to different uses and applications, the required
validation must also change.”).
83
Weisgram v. Marley, 528 U.S. 440, 445 (2000).
84
Id. at 456-57 (emphasis added).
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Rule 702 was amended in 2000.85 Rule 702 requires that an “expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” be “based on
sufficient facts or data,” “the product of reliable principles and
methods,” and “reliably applied . . . to the facts of the case.”86 This
amendment effectively codifies several key provisions of the Daubert
trilogy. First, it maintains the judge’s gatekeeping role to ensure that
the expert testimony is based on reliable principles and methods.
Second, this role extends to all expert evidence, not just scientific
evidence. Third, it adds the word “sufficient,” mandating that courts
not simply evaluate whether there are some facts or data supporting
the expert’s opinion, but that those bases are sufficient to support that
opinion. Finally, and somewhat less remarked upon than the other
components of Rule 702, the amendment obligates trial courts to
check whether the basis for the expert’s opinion can be “reliably
applied” to the particular case.
The Daubert trilogy, together with Weisgram and amended Rule 702,
fairly well demonstrate that the Court meant to impose at least notinsubstantial demands on proffered expert evidence. These authorities
accomplished this heightened inspection through the adoption of a
test with a certain degree of scientific sophistication. On its face, at
least, this observation suggests that the Court sought to bring a certain
scientific sensibility to evidentiary decisions about expert evidence.
The Daubert trilogy, under this view, would signify that the law had
finally joined the scientific revolution. As the next section discusses,
however, the purpose of the Daubert trilogy was more pedestrian than
that, albeit still revolutionary. It was politically revolutionary, though
by choosing the scientific paradigm as its vehicle, the Court sparked
an intellectual revolution at the same time.
III. MANAGERIAL JUDGING
Throughout this Essay, two hypotheses have competed to explain
the Daubert trilogy. Both posit that Daubert was a revolutionary
event.87 One holds that it was a revolution of ideas, bringing scientific
85

The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules proposed amending the rule “on
experts in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert.” Advisory Committee on
Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Evidence (Apr. 6-7, 1998)
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/
0498evidenceminutes.htm.
86
FED. R. EVID. 702. The quoted language is drawn from the “restyled rules,”
which went into effect in 2012. The restyling was not intended to change the meaning
of any of the rules.
87
Of course, other hypotheses are possible, including that Daubert was not
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sensibilities to the law of evidence, and any political ramifications
were secondary. The second holds that it was a revolution of politics,
intended to give trial courts greater managerial power over their
dockets, and any intellectual ramifications were secondary. Based on
several grounds, the second hypothesis appears to accord more closely
to the evidence.
This section examines these grounds. Space precludes an exhaustive
treatment of the issue, and indeed this matter could occupy a book.
But, on the whole, the evidence appears clear that Daubert and its
progeny were designed to improve trial courts’ ability to manage
cases.88 In particular, three separate grounds support this conclusion:
(1) the Court’s repeated statements throughout the Daubert trilogy
regarding trial court discretion and deferential appellate review for
admissibility decisions; (2) the disposition of the cases of the Daubert
trilogy, as well as Weisgram; and (3) the more vehement results
stemming from the rigors of Daubert in civil cases than in criminal
cases.89
revolutionary at all. Bert Black fondly tells the story of what Judge Thomas Reavley
said about Daubert: “Never has a case changed the law so little and practice so much.”
Bert Black, Remarks at the University of California, Davis Law Review Symposium:
The Daubert Hearing — From All the Critical Perspectives (Mar. 2, 2012), in 46 UC
DAVIS L. REV. <FIRST PAGE OF TRANSCRIPT>, <PIN CITE> (2013).
88
I have largely avoided the greater and more fact-intensive question whether
Daubert has indeed resulted in courts exercising greater case management. I consider
this question somewhat, but only cursorily, infra notes 100-115 and accompanying
text, in discussing Daubert’s possible differential application in civil and criminal
cases.
89
A possible fourth ground could come this year with the Supreme Court’s
decision to grant certiorari in Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011),
cert. granted, 80 USLW 3442 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (No. 11-864).
The Court will consider the question of “whether a district court may certify a class
action without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible
evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to awarding
damages on a class-wide basis.” Id. This issue has led to a split in the circuit courts.
See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a
district court must consider the merits if they overlap with class certification issues);
Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that a district court
may resolve disputes going to the factual setting of the case if necessary to the class
certification analysis). In Wal-Mart Stores Inc., v. Dukes, the Court off-handedly
addressed this issue stating, “The District Court concluded that Daubert did not apply
to expert testimony at the certification-stage of class-action proceedings. We doubt
that is so . . . .” 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553-54 (2011) (citation omitted).
The lower courts have fundamentally disagreed regarding the required Daubert
analysis at the class certification stage. Compare In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prod. Liab.
Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 612-14 (8th Cir. 2011) (rejecting call to require “a full and
conclusive Daubert inquiry” at the class certification stage, and concluding that the
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A. Deference to Trial Court Admissibility Decisions
If the Supreme Court’s focus had been to improve the scientific
quality of the judiciary, it would have crafted a rule that included
appellate courts in the gatekeeping function. This is so for several
reasons. First, scientific evidence can be complex and difficult and not
readily handled by busy trial courts. Unlike trial courts, appellate
courts have both the luxury of time and the luxury of numbers. The
appellate experience is typically more cerebral and academic, exactly
the sort of qualities that would best resolve complex scientific
questions.90
Another — and perhaps more compelling — reason for inviting
appellate participation in scientific evidentiary disputes is that many of
“tailored Daubert analysis” used by the district court was sufficient), with American
Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen an expert’s
report or testimony is critical to class certification, . . . a district court must
conclusively rule on any challenge to the expert’s qualifications or submissions prior
to ruling on a class certification motion. That is, the district court must perform a full
Daubert analysis before certifying the class if the situation warrants.”). If the Court
decides, as might be expected given the statement in Dukes, that Daubert applies at the
certification-stage of class actions, it will constitute an additional ground for the
conclusion reached in this section — that the Daubert trilogy was meant to further the
managerial function of trial courts.
90
Judge D. Brooks Smith, in a talk on the Y2K litigation in Austin, Texas, related a
humorous allegory that perfectly captures the different roles of trial, appellate, and
Supreme Court judges. It follows:
It seems that there were three members of the federal judiciary who had
gotten together for a duck hunt: a Supreme Court justice, a member of the
court of appeals, and a district judge. The trio were warned that in the
particular venue they had selected the game laws were strictly enforced, and
that they should take great care to be shooting at the right thing.
Well, the morning of the hunt arrived, and as the three stood in the duck
blind, a bird flew from the water to their right. The Supreme Court justice
stepped forward, raised his shotgun, and pondered, “The question before me
is to determine first the nature of a duck. This is not simply a question of
definition; it is an issue of ontological import.” And by the time the justice
had held forth on the ontology of “duckness,” the bird was gone.
Then came the appeals court judge, who quickly got a bead on the next bird
to come off the water, and who, upon seeing it, ruminated, “We assume, of
course, that all ornithological requirements are met. But to assure that what
we confront is in fact a duck, we will establish a three-part test. First . . . ”
Again, by this time, the bird was no longer in sight. Finally, it was the turn
of the district judge. As soon as he saw something fly within range, he fired
away, brought down a bird, and exclaimed, “Damn, I hope that was a duck.”
D. Brooks Smith, The Managerial Judge and Y2K Litigation, 18 REV. LITIG. 403, 404
(1999).
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the controverted issues surrounding applied science are not case
specific. Indeed, all of the applied science introduced in courts is
based explicitly or implicitly on general principles or findings that
transcend particular cases. A toxic tort case, for example, might appear
to present the question whether Bendectin caused the plaintiff’s birth
defects. But this determination depends on research that demonstrates
first of all that Bendectin can sometimes cause birth defects in the
population. Whether Bendectin causes birth defects is a fact that is not
particular to an individual case or a specific jurisdiction. Similarly, the
validity of DNA profiling, firearms identification technology, or
polygraphs all depend on general research findings. As a matter of the
logic of scientific discovery, there is absolutely no reason why an
appellate court should be deferential to a trial court regarding general
scientific findings.
In Joiner, however, the Court held that the ordinary standard —
“abuse of discretion” — that applies to trial court evidentiary rulings
“should apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude
expert testimony under Daubert.”91 There was no mention of the
differences between scientific evidence and ordinary evidence, and no
discussion of any benefit to courts’ use of science by having appellate
participation in this review.
Even more telling than the standard settled upon in Joiner are the
statements regarding appellate deference in Kumho Tire. The key issue
in Kumho Tire was whether the gatekeeping obligations of Daubert
extended to non-scientific — i.e., “technical or other specialized” —
evidence. The Court ruled that it did, but this holding meant that
courts would have to identify the global criteria by which to measure
the validity of experts who are not “scientists,” such as historians, real
estate appraisers, economists, and accountants. This result is the sort
of meta-consideration on which a scientifically sensible jurisprudence
might seek appellate court input. The Kumho Tire Court, however,
came to the opposite conclusion, again investing broad discretionary
authority in trial courts. The Court explained its reasoning as follows:
The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding
how to test an expert’s reliability, and to decide whether or
when special briefing or other proceedings are needed to
investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether or
not that expert’s relevant testimony is reliable. Our opinion in
Joiner makes clear that a court of appeals is to apply an abuseof-discretion standard when it “review[s] a trial court’s
91

Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997).
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decision to admit or exclude expert testimony.” That standard
applies as much to the trial court’s decisions about how to
determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion. Otherwise,
the trial judge would lack the discretionary authority needed
both to avoid unnecessary “reliability” proceedings in ordinary
cases where the reliability of an expert’s methods is properly
taken for granted, and to require appropriate proceedings in
the less usual or more complex cases where cause for
questioning the expert’s reliability arises. Indeed, the Rules
seek to avoid “unjustifiable expense and delay” as part of their
search for “truth” and the “jus[t] determin[ation]” of
proceedings. Thus, whether Daubert’s specific factors are, or
are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case
is a matter that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to
determine.92
The trial court under Kumho Tire thus largely determines both what
criteria are used to test reliability and whether the expert’s testimony
meets those criteria. Moreover, the Court highlighted the fact that this
broad delegation of authority is tailored, at least in part, to avoiding
unjustifiable expense and delay.
The Supreme Court’s insistence that trial courts have broad
discretion over what factors are used to determine reliability as well as
the judgment over whether the proffered testimony is reliable, invest
them with considerable authority to manage these cases. As the Kumho
Tire Court made clear, this authority ensures that judges have the
“discretionary authority” to hold or dispense with “appropriate
proceedings,” as they see fit.93 And, importantly, these judgments can
be informed by the objective of avoiding “unjustifiable expense and
delay,” though the ultimate objective is the “search for ‘truth’” and the
“jus[t] determination” of proceedings.94 “Truth,” it might be argued,
would be more likely to be advanced by having appellate courts
participate in the process of resolving disputed scientific evidence.
Such a process, however, would surely be inimical to avoiding
“expense and delay.”

92
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152-53 (1999) (internal citations
omitted).
93
Id. at 152.
94
Id. at 152-53.
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B. The Daubert Trilogy, Weisgram, and Summary Dispositions
Toward the end of its Daubert opinion, the Court observed that “in
the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence
presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable
juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the
court remains free to direct a judgment . . ., and likewise to grant
summary judgment.”95 On remand, the Ninth Circuit held, as a matter
of law, that the evidence did not pass muster under Daubert and
directed a verdict for the defendant.96
The other two legs of the trilogy ended similarly. Although the
Joiner Court found that there remained open questions necessitating
remand for further proceedings, the Court’s affirmance of the district
court’s principal ruling finding that the plaintiff’s experts’ testimony
was inadmissible effectively ended the case.97 In Kumho Tire, the trial
court had excluded the plaintiff’s expert and granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment, a ruling affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
The case that most supports the hypothesis that Daubert and its
progeny were intended to serve case management needs of trial courts
is, ironically, the one case in which an appellate court’s management
was affirmed. As noted above, the trial court in Weisgram admitted
plaintiffs’ three experts on the question of whether a home heater had
been defective and caused the fire. The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiffs. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting the plaintiffs’ experts. The circuit
court, however, then held as a matter of law that the expert opinion
was inadmissible and then remanded and ordered the district court to
enter judgment for defendant. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the
circuit court erred when it granted judgment as a matter of law to the
defendant after excluding the plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony. The
Weisgram Court disagreed. The Court held “that the authority of
courts of appeals to direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law
extends to cases in which, on excision of testimony erroneously
admitted, there remains insufficient evidence to support a jury’s
verdict.”98
95
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (internal
citations omitted).
96
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995).
97
A subsequent history search on Westlaw indicated that the Eleventh Circuit
remanded the case pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling, but there are no
subsequent reports from the trial court at present.
98
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 540, 457 (2000).
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Although it is a set of only four cases, it can hardly be a coincidence
that all four of the Court’s major expert evidence cases ended with the
exclusion of the proffered expertise and summary disposition on the
merits. This exclusion is not to suggest, of course, that the Court
intends to erect insurmountable barriers to complex litigation
involving substantial expert testimony. But the Court has complete
control of its docket and is reputed to select cases with one eye on
their convenience for reaching particular outcomes and the other on
the messages that will be sent.99 Daubert, Joiner, Kumho Tire, and
Weisgram, were, by this measure, all of a kind. They each contained
relatively weak expert evidence in which close inspection of their
scientific premises led to their exclusion, followed by summary
judgment. The message seems fairly clear.
C. Do the Rigors of Daubert Apply Equally to Criminal Cases?
Rule 702 does not distinguish between civil and criminal cases and
so its dictates should apply equally in the two contexts.100 And courts
have so held.101 Yet, all of the action in the Supreme Court, from
Daubert to Weisgram, has been on the civil side of the docket. If the
issue is simply one of scientific sophistication, Daubert should play out
similarly in civil and criminal cases. However, if Daubert is principally
about case management, we should expect substantial differences in
these two areas. The idea of the managerial judge is largely limited to
civil cases. Once again, though the evidence is not conclusive, lower

99

See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-five
Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1707 (2000) (“[T]he Supreme
Court does not so much grant certiorari to particular cases, but rather to particular
questions.”); see generally SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE
SUPREME COURT’S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS (1986)
(introducing a managerial model of the Supreme Court’s case selection process); H.W.
PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
(1994) (examining the case selection process from 1976 to 1980 through interviews
with Justices and their clerks).
100
This section of the Essay draws significantly from the discussion in FAIGMAN ET
AL., supra note 6, at 114-17.
101
See United States v. Bahena, 223 F.3d 797, 808 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Daubert does
apply to criminal cases.”); see also United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 11415 (D. Mass. 2010) (“While most of the [listed] cases [involving fire experts] are civil,
it cannot be that science is different in criminal cases than in civil ones. Bad science is
bad science; unreliable methodologies are unreliable methodologies, no matter the
side of the docket.”).
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courts at least appear to take their gatekeeping duties more seriously
in managing civil cases.102
Social scientists have increasingly raised the issue whether courts, in
fact, employ Daubert more lackadaisically in criminal trials —
especially in regard to prosecution evidence — than in civil cases,
especially in regard to plaintiffs’ evidence. This allegation is a serious
charge. Early research, however, lends some credence to it. Several
studies have examined the patterns of admissibility decisions in cases
decided prior to and after the adoption of Daubert, casting at least
some light on the behavior of both federal and state courts in several
categories of cases.103 Comparisons of the rate of pretrial challenges to
the admissibility of expert evidence before and following Daubert
found a marked increase overall.104 But, in the civil arena, Risinger
found nearly ninety percent of the challenges being raised by
defendants against plaintiffs’ expert evidence. Among the criminal
cases, where the overwhelming bulk of expert evidence is offered by
the government, defendants are far less active in bringing challenges,
often failing to raise objections that would have been reasonable and
available, and which presumably would have been raised in a civil case
involving evidence with similarly weak foundations. Of the challenges
to expert evidence brought in federal courts, fewer than ten percent
were in criminal cases. Of those, the prosecution brought more
challenges to defense evidence than vice-versa by a ratio of seven to
two, though the government presents the far larger target for attack.105
Given that a challenge is mounted, what is the response of the
courts? In civil cases, the answer is that the post-Daubert courts are
more likely to exclude challenged expert evidence than they had been
before. Dixon & Gill found exclusion of challenged expert evidence to
102
This appears to be the general view among academic writers. See Donald E.
Shelton, Forensic Science Evidence and Judicial Bias in Criminal Cases, 49 NO. 3 JUDGES’
J. 18, 19-20, 24 (Summer 2010); see also Elizabeth L. DeCoux, The Admission of
Unreliable Expert Testimony Offered by the Prosecution: What’s Wrong with Daubert and
How to Make it Right, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 131, 132-33 (2007); Jennifer L. Groscup et
al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal
Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 346 (2002); Wes R. Porter, Repeating,
Yet Evading Review: Admitting Reliable Expert Testimony in Criminal Cases Still Depends
Upon Who Is Asking, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 48, 49 (2009); D. Michael Risinger,
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the
Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 109-12 (2000).
103
See DeCoux, supra note 102; Risinger, supra note 102.
104
See Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert
Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
251, 298 (2002); Risinger, supra note 102, at 102-05.
105
Risinger, supra note 102, at 109-10.
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result about fifty percent of the time pre-Daubert, rising to as much as
seventy percent in years post-Daubert.106 In Krafka et al.’s surveys
conducted both before and after Daubert, federal judges reported
excluding or limiting challenged expert evidence twenty-five percent
of the time pre-Daubert compared to forty-one percent of the time
post-Daubert.107 But as between plaintiffs and defendants, the data
reveal a notable lack of symmetry. Risinger found that defendants
succeeded about two-thirds of the time in the many federal cases in
which they challenged plaintiff experts.108 In the smaller set of cases
where plaintiffs challenged defense-proffered expertise, the challenges
succeeded less than half the time.109 This pattern was repeated on
appeal.110 In state civil cases, Risinger found that challenges by
plaintiffs and by defendants succeeded at about the same forty percent
rate, but of course defendants were more active in bringing challenges
(eighty-two percent of the challenges on appeal were by
defendants).111 A reading of the cases confirms that courts have
become more aggressive in their scrutiny and exclusion of evidence in
civil cases.
On the criminal side, the picture is quite different. Risinger found
that, post-Daubert, defense challenges to government evidence
succeeded less than ten percent of the time in federal district courts.112
Government challenges to defense evidence succeeded two-thirds of
the time. On appeal, defense-proffered expertise was found to have
been properly excluded eighty-three percent of the time.113
Prosecution-proffered expertise that had been admitted at trial was
excluded only once on appeal. Defendants did somewhat better in
state courts than in federal courts, winning a quarter of their
challenges.114 Prosecution challenges to defense expertise succeeded
about three-quarters of the time.115
106

Dixon & Gill, supra note 104, at 225.
Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns
Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 322
(2002).
108
See Risinger, supra note 102, at 110.
109
See id.
110
See id.
111
See id. at 111.
112
See id. at 108.
113
See id.
114
See id. at 111.
115
See id. Groscup et al.’s data (criminal cases drawn from federal appellate courts)
suggest that patterns of admission and exclusion are unchanged from before Daubert
to after, and that this pattern holds true for each category of expert testimony
107
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“Of course, none of this,” Risinger notes, “goes directly to the
validity of any given decision,’’ but the data ‘‘are fairly striking in their
own right.”116 One possibility is that the differences between civil and
criminal cases reflect meaningful differences in science being used or
its application to the different groups of cases, and that there are
systematic differences between the factual issues that arise in civil and
criminal cases. Or, perhaps, the differential outcomes are attributable
to differences in the quality of advocacy (borne of differences in
resources) in the two realms. On the other hand, some commentators
suggest that social and political differences easily explain the
differential treatment: that, as a general proposition, judges disfavor
civil plaintiffs and criminal defendants and are more likely to rule
against them than against their opposites even when presenting
equivalent evidence or arguments. A more definitive explanation of
the pattern awaits future research.
CONCLUSION
History will one day record definitively the revolutionary character
of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Daubert fundamentally
altered the perspective by which courts evaluate the admissibility of
expert testimony. Under the Ancien Régime of Frye v. United States,
courts merely assessed whether the basis for scientific evidence was
generally accepted in the particular field from which it came. This test
demanded little scientific sophistication, and courts rarely evidenced
any sophistication in applying it. Daubert, in contrast, requires courts
to assess the methods and principles underlying proffered expertise.
The validity test of Daubert thus places a considerable onus on trial
court judges to understand basic principles of statistics and scientific
research methods.117 To be sure, courts have yet to adequately fulfill
examined. Much of the difference between the conclusions of this study and that of
the others is probably attributable to the universe of cases on which it focused.
Specifically, the findings reflect the behavior of the courts in the body of cases
examined. As Groscup et al. realize, by focusing on appellate cases, they are missing
most of the action (or inaction) at the trial court level. The only trial rulings their
selection method captures are those that resulted in appeal, meaning cases in which
defendants lost Daubert challenges followed by losing their trials. On the other hand,
their method allows them to see more precisely how the decisions of appellate courts
compare to the decisions of trial courts on the same cases. Jennifer Groscup et al.,
supra note 102, at 342-44 (2002).
116
See Risinger, supra note 102, at 108.
117
See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (quoting Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)) (“[Daubert] imposes a special
obligation upon a trial judge to ‘ensure that any and all scientific testimony . . . is not
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this obligation. Indeed, the Daubert revolution will not be fully
realized until they do.
Although Daubert’s revolutionary character lies principally in
altering the intellectual preconceptions of Frye’s Ancien Régime, this
was probably not the Supreme Court’s intention. Instead, this Essay
argues that the Court had a somewhat more modest and more
pedestrian intention. Specifically, close consideration of Daubert and
its progeny indicates that the Court’s principal objective was to
empower trial courts to better control their dockets. The cases of
Daubert, Joiner, Kumho Tire, and Weisgram all support the thesis that
the Court invoked a validity test for expert opinion testimony in order
to improve trial courts’ ability to manage cases.
Still, whatever the original motivation the Court might have had for
setting forth a validity test for expert evidence, the shift in perspective
of this new test fundamentally transformed legal practice. Daubert was
decided on June 28, 1993. Although we are twenty years into the
revolution, it still remains too early to say just how much has changed.
Yet everything is different.

only relevant, but reliable.’”).

